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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCES
The division of the territory of a city into certain zones
is the natural consequence of a city's growth. All cities, by
the nature of their growth and the natural use of the property
within their corporate limits, are divided into three distinct
zones. The manufacturing industries naturally collect into a
convenient location where transportation for the products produced in the factories are accessible, the retail business men
build their business houses in the central part of the city so
that they may have a convenient location which is easy of access
by the entire inhabitants of the city, and those who desire to
establish homes, schools and churches select locations away
from the noise of factories and the clang and confusion of
traffic. The creation of these zones is the inevitable consequence
of the desires of the various inhabitants of the city, but after
these zones have been established many problems may arise
concerning the property rights of those who own property in
these districts and those who desire to maintain the districts for
the original purpose for which they were established. The
legislative bodies in various jurisdictions, after taking notice of
the fact that certain uses of property are not conducive to the
peace, happiness and general welfare of those who have established homes in certain localities, have granted the municipal
legislative bodies authority to enact legislation prohibiting the
establishment of uses which would interfere with the natural
enjoyment of residential property. It is the purpose of this
article to consider the constitutionality of ordinances enacted
by municipal legislative bodies under the authority delegated to
them by state legislation.
A municipal corporation is a creature of the state; it exists
by virtue of the authority of the state government, and its
powers are defined and controlled by its creator. Kent has defined a municipal corporation as being "a public corporation
created by the government for political purposes, and having
subordinate and local powers of legislation.'' This creature of
the state has its local self governing body; that is, it is composed
of executive, judicial and legislative departments. In the enforcement of police regulations it becomes an agent of the state
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and it is delegated the power by the state to enact ordinances
for the general welfare of its inhabitants and due to its inherent powers resulting from the nature of its organization, the
nature of its ppwers and duties there are numerous human
activities which are subject to municipal police regulation. The
municipal corporation by virtue of its organization has delegated
to it by the state a certain residuum of police power and further
authorization is unnecessary when this power concerns purely
local and municipal matters, for by the organization of a city
the state grants to it the powers necessary for the performance
of its functions, and to the protection of its citizens in their
person and property and the police power is one of these functions. The legislative body of the state may declare certain
uses of property when the use interferes with the safety, health,
morals or the general welfare of the citizenry of the state as
being a nuisance, 2 or it may delegate authority to its agent,
the municipal corporation, to enact ordinances against any unwarranted interference with the property rights of the citizens
living within the corporate limits of the municipal corporation,3 and such authority has been so granted by numerous
state legislative bodies. The extent to which a municipal corporation may restrict the use of property within its corporate
limits is an interesting and complicated question which affects
the lives and property rights of citizens living under its municipal authority.
The lawmaking body of a state may delegate to the municipal
corporations within its boundaries all powers incidental to municipal government, whether legislative or otherwise, without violating the rule against the delegation of the legislative powers of ihe
legislative body of a state. In the case of the City of Jackson v.
Bowden the court held that, "In conferring upon municipalities
appropriate quasi-legislative powers for local governmental purposes, the legislature does not violate the implied principle of organic law that the legislature shall not delegate its general lawmaking power."14 Under the authority granted to municipal corporations by the lawmaking power of the state various ordinances
2

City of Des Moi2nes v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096.
Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.; Welch v. Swasey, 166 Mass. 83.
'67 Fla. 181, 65 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916D 913; also see Commonwealth v. Union Pass R. Go., 163 Pa. 22, 29 A. 711; Commonwealth v.
Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848, L. R. A. 1915E, 264; and Embee
v. Xansas City, 257 Mo. 593, 116 S. W. 282.
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have been enacted controlling and limiting the use of property
located within the corporate limits of the municipalites. These
ordinances generally establish building lines in residential zones,
prohibit the building of business houses in residential districts
and divide the city into fire zones, and prescribe the type and
character of buildings which may be erected in certain defined
territories.
The 1908 Acts, page 623, of the state of Virginia, authorized
the councils of cities and towns "to make regulations concerning the building of houses in the city or town, and in their discretion in particular districts or along particular streets, to
prescribe and establish building lines, or to require property
owners in certain localities or districts to leave a certain percentage of lots free from buildings and to regulate the height
of buildings." By virtue of the authority vested in the legislative bodies of the cities and towns in the state of Virginia
the city of Richmond enacted the following ordinance:
"That whenever the owners of two-thirds of property abutting on any street shall, in writing, request the committee on
streets to establish a building line on the side of the square
on which their property fronts, the said committee shall establish such line so that the same shall not be less than 5 feet nor
more than 30 feet from the street line. And no permit for the
erection of any building upon such front of the square upon
which such building line is so established shall be issued except
for the construction of houses within the limits of such line."
In the case of Eubank v. City of Richmond 5 the court
held that to limit the use of property as prescribed by the ordinance cannot be upheld as an exercise of the police power. In
this decision the court stated that "The only discretion, we
have seen, which exists in the street committee or in the committee of public safety, is in the location of the line, between
5 and 30 feet. It is hard to understand how public comfort or
convenience, much less public health, can be promoted by a line
which may be so variously disposed.
"We are testing the ordinance by its extreme possibilities
'226 U. S. 137, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123; also see Williamson v.
Cooke, 54 Col. 320, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1030; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo.
527, 21 L. R. A. 226, and People, ex re7 Dilzer v. Calder, 85 N. Y. Supp.
1015.
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to show how in its tendency and in instances it enables the convenience or purpose of one set of property owners to control
the property rights of others, and property determined, as the
case may be, for business or residence-even, it may be, the
kind of business or character of residence. One person having
a two-thirds ownership of a block may have the power against
a number having a less collective ownership. This we have
said, is the vice of the ordinance, and makes it, we think, an
unreasonable exercise of the police power."
In the case of Windsor v. Whitney 6 a special act providing
for the creation of a town planning commission whose duty
was defined as being that of making surveys and maps of Windsor, section by section, showing locations for any public building, highway, street or parkway layouts, including street, building and veranda lines. The defendants in this case were engaged in the development of a tract of land in Windsor and
opened streets, established building and curb lines not in accordance with the plans of the town commission. The court
held that "a legislative requirement, such as the act before u,
that private highways laid out in land development schemes
shall be of a reasonable width and that reasonable building lines
shall be established upon these streets before the erection of
buildings fronting upon these streets shall be permitted, is well
within the police power, and does not offend against the fourteenth amendment."
It is to be noted that in the Eubank case the line established was in a settled residential section and that it was so
established because the citizens of this section owning twothirds of the property desired the establishment of the building
line, while in the Windsor case the section of the city under
consideration was one free from buildings of any kind. The
Eubank decision states that, "We need not consider the power
of a city to establish building line or regulate the structure
or height of buildings." This case holds nothing more than
that to allow property owners who own two-thirds of the property along a street to compel the remaining owners to place
buildings along a certain line does not come within the police
power. The Windsor case holds that a city may be established
695 Conn. 357, 111 A. 354, 12 A. L. R. 669; also see Halsefl v. Fergw-

so4, 202 S. W. 317.
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according to a general plan determined by a city planning
commission, that the establishment of a eity according to a
plan having for its purpose the regulation of the use of the
property for the general benefit and welfare of the inhabitants is within the police power and does not take property
without compensation. These two cases do not represent conflicting opinions, for when the particular facts of each case are
considered it must be admitted that these facts control each
decision. The courts have generally held, that statutes providing for a building line are unconstitutional, that such acts cannot be sustained under the police power, and that they take
property without due compensation, but if it may be shown
that in the establishment of new municipal districts, the general
public health, public morals and the general public welfare have
been served by the enactment of such legislation these acts
will be construed as coming within the police power of the
state and as being constitutional.
The city of Minneapolis, under proper legislative authority,
passed an ordinance establishing a residential district providing that, "no person shall hereafter erect within said district
any building except double houses, flats, tenement and apartment houses, and there are hereby prohibited within said district the erection, and maintenance of hotels, stores, factories,
warhonses, dry cleaning plants, public garages or stables, or
any industrial establishment or any business whatsoever."
7
In S t ate ex rel. Laclhtnww v. HaughtoW
this ordinance is
held to be unconstitutional in so far as it applies to retail store
buildings. In this opinion the court said that, "The police
power of the state is very broad, but not without limits. Under it the legislative power may impose any reasonable restrictions and may make any reasonable regulations in, respect to
the use which the owner may make of his property, which tends
to promote the general well-being or to secure to others that
use and enjoyment of their own property to which they are lawfully entitled; but when the legislative power attempts to forbid
the owner from making a use of his property which is not harmful to the public, and does not interfere with the rightful use
and enjoyment of their own property by others, it invades
' 134 Minn. 226, L. R. A. (1917F) 1050.
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property rights secured to the owner by both state and federal Constitutions. Only such use of property as may produce injurious consequences, or infringe the lawful rights of
others, can be prohibited without violating the constitutional
provisions that the owner shall not be deprived of his property
without due process of law nor without compensation therefor
first paid or secured. That the right of a property owner to
erect a store building upon his land is within the protection of
these constitutional provisions, and cannot be taken away under
the guise of a police regulation, is so universally recognized
that an extended search has failed to disclose any decision
holding otherwise either in fact or in principle. We are forced
to the conclusion that the ordinance in question cannot be sustained in so far as it prohibits the erection of an ordinary
store building. This does not mean, however, that it is not
valid in so far as it applies to structures or occupations which
are in the regular domain of the police power."
In People ex rel. Friend v. Ghicago8 the court considered
an ordinance similar to the ordinance in the Lachtman case9
and though the legislative authority in Illinois had not granted
municipalities the authority to enact such ordinances the court
stated that "even if the municipality is clothed with the whole
police power of the state, it would still not have the power to
deprive citizens of valuable property rights under the guise
of prohibiting or regulating some business or corporation that
has no tendency whatever to injure the public health or public
morals, or interfere with the general welfare. An act of the
legislature which deprives the citizen of his liberty or property rights cannot be sustained under the police power unless
the public health, comfort, safety, or welfare demands such
enactment. . . . There is nothing inherently dangerous to
the health or safety of the public in conducting a-retail store."
a261 Ill. 16, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 438.
The Chicago ordinance provided that. "It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm, or corporation to locate, build or construct any store for
the sale, at retail, of goods, wares, and merchandise on any street, in
any block in which all buildings are used exclusively for residence purposes, without first securing and filing with the commissioner of buildIngs the written consent of a majority of the property owners according to frontage, on both sides of the street in the block In which the
building to be thus used is located.
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In Spann v. City of Dallas'° the court, in considering an
ordinance prohibiting the building of a business house in a
residence section, stated that "It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country that either state or municipal authorities
can, by their mere declaration, make a particular use of property a nuisance which is not so, and subject it to the ban of
absolute prohibition."
An Iowa statute authorizes cities of that state, upon a
petition of sixty per cent of the owners of real estate residing
in any district of the corporate limits of a city, to enact an
ordinance declaring this district as being a restricted residence
district. Under the authority of this statute the city of Des
Moines, after it had been petitioned by the citizens of a certain
district, enacted an ordinance declaring this district as being
a restricted residence district, and among other things this
ordinance provided that "no buildings or other structures, except residences, schoolhouses, churches and other similar structures, shall be hereafter erected, reconstructed, altered, repaired,
or occupied within said district without first securing from the
city council a permit therefor; nor shall any such permit be
granted when sixty per cent of the owners of real estate in
said district residing in said city object thereto.
"Any building or structure erected, altered, repaired, or
used in violation of any of the provisions of this ordinance, is
"
hereby declared to be a nuisance.
In City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil, Company"l this
statute came before the court for judicial construction upon
the presentation to the court of the following facts: While the
action concerning the enactment of the above ordinance requested by the property holders was pending, the defendants,
with knowledge of the pendency of the application to establish
the restricted district, applied for a building permit to build
an automobile filling station at the intersection of two streets
within the zone outlined in the property holders' petition, and
"1235 S. W. (Tex.) 513, 19 A. L. R. 1387; also see S. Louis v. Dorr,
145 Mo. 466, 42 L. R. A. 686; Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 44 L. 1I.A.
(N. S.) 1030; Calvo v. New Orleans, 136 La. 480, 67 So. 338; Stubbs T.
Scott, 127 Md. 86, 95 Atl. 1060; Quintini v. Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. 483,
62 So. 625; People, ex rel. Corn HiZZ Realty Co. v. Stroebel, 209 N. Y.
434, 103 N. E. 735; and Levy v. Marvlag, 115 Atl. (N. J.) 350.
1193 Iowa 1096, 23 L. R. A. 1322.
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the council, without having acted upon the petition of the
property owners, passed a resolution granting the permit, but
within a few days adopted another resolution rescinding it.
Shortly following the granting and rescinding of the building
permit, the council passed the ordinance creating the residential
district requested by the petitioners. This is a suit in equity
by the city of Des Moines to enjoin the defendants from the
erection and maintaining of the proposed gasoline and oil filling station.
The court held that a statute permitting the establishment of residential districts in municipalities does not unconstitutionally take private property located within the district
for the private use of others, that a police regulation is not invalid because it may operate to restrict the individual citizen
in the use of his own property, or even in his liberty, that the
police power extends to the promotion of public convenience and
general prosperity, that giving residents of a district in a
municipality power to initiate by petition a project to restrict
the use of the property therein to residential purposes does not
unconstitutionally delegate to them legislative power, that the
state may enforce reasonable regulations concerning the use
and occupation of real estate in cities and towns, and that the
legislature may authorize municipalities to establish districts
within which no building shall be erected for commercial purposes without a license.
The language used by the court is significant and illustrative of the trend of present day authorities on this subject.
This opinion states that, "With the changing conditions necessarily attendant upon the growth and density of population,
and the ceaseless changes taking place in method and manner
of carrying on the multiplying lines of human industry, the
greater becomes the demand upon that reserve element of sovereignty which we call the police power, for such reasonable
supervision and regulation as the state may impose, to insure
observance by the individual citizen of the duty to use his property and exercise his rights and privileges with due regard to
the personal and property rights and privileges of others.
"To justify the exercise of such authority it is not necessary that the subject thereof shall be inherently wrong; nor
is the fact that such regulation may operate to restrict the
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individual citizen in the use of his own property, or even in his
liberty, of itself sufficient to render the regulation or restriction void.
"The interest of the individual or subordinate to the publie good, and the constitutional guaranties of the security of
private property were not designated and do not operate to
prohibit the reasonable restriction of its use by legislation enacted within the sphere of the police power for the promotion
of the public welfare."
In People ex rel. Busching v. Ericsson, City Building Cornmissioner,12 the court held that the police power extends to
the forbidding of the construction of a public garage within a
city block without the consent of a majority of the owners of
property in such block, without depriving the one seeking to
do so of any right of liberty or property.
In Newton v. Joyce"3 an ordinance prohibiting the erection of a blacksmith shop in a residence district without the
written consent of a majority of the property owners was upIn Barbier v.
held as being a valid exercise of police power.
14
of laundries
operation
the
prohibiting
ordinance
an
Connelly
as not
considered
was
district
city
a
certain
during the night in
v.
Rock
Little
In
being open to constitutional objections.
prohibiting
Reirnman-Wolfort Auto Livery Co.3s an ordinance
the maintenance of a livery stable in a certain district of the
6
city was held to be constitutional. In Welch v. Swasey" the
court held that the state may, in the exercise of the police power,
limit the height of buildings to be erected in cities when, in its
judgment, the public health or public safety so require such
regulations, and that the legislature may delegate to a commission the power to determine the boundaries of the section
of the city in which the buildings of different heights as determined by the legislature shall be erected. In this case the
-L. R. A. (1915D) 607, 263 Ill. 368, 105 N. E. 315; also see Hado.
check v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394; Standard Oil Co. v. Danville, 199 Ill.
50, 64 N. E. 1110; People, ex rel. Keller v. Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365, 107 N.
636; and Storer v. Downey, 215 Mass. 273, 102 N. E. 321.
166 Mass. 83, 44 N. E. 116.
4113

U.

S.

27.

u237 U. S. 171.
" 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1160; also see
Kemp v. D'Oench, 111 N. Y. 359, 18 N. E. 862; Knowlton v. Williams,

174 Mass. 476, affirmed by U. S. Supreme Court in 188 U. S. 491.
L. J.-3

KNTUCoKy LAw JOURNAL

court stated thati "It is for the legislature to determine whether
the public health or public safety requires such a limitation of
the rights of landowners in a given case. Upon a determination
in the affirmative they may legislate accordingly." This case
was brought before the United States Supreme Court, and the
7
views expressed in it were- affirmed.'
18
Cochrom v. Presto
sustained the following ordinance:
"That from and after the date of the passage of this act, no
building, except churches, shall be erected in the city of Baltimore on territory bounded by the south side of Madison
street, the west side of S. Paul street, and the east side of Cathedral street, to exceed in height a point 70 feet above the surface of the street at -the base line of Washington Monument."
This opinion states that, "Among the police powers of the
state the right to regulate the height of buildings is one that
cannot be questioned.
"The very existence of government presupposes the right
of the sovereign power to prescribe regulations, demanded by
the general welfare, for the eommon protection of all. This
principle inheres in the very nature of the social compact. The
protection of private property is one of the main purposes of
government, but no one holds his property by such an absolute
tenure as to be freed from the power of the legislature to impose restraints and burdens required by the public good, or
proper and necessary to secure the equal rights of all."
In the consideration of the constitutionality of building
zone ordinances there appear to be many conflicting decisions,
but when the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
each case are taken into consideration, the authorities may be
harmonized. The police power of the state represents the reserve power which may be called upon to control the varied
conditions which arise due to the growing complexity of our civilization. During the early history of the development and
growth of municipal governments, the state, due to the natural
simplicity of the development of these governmental agencies,
was not called upon to exert its reserve power as often as it
is under growth of modern municipalities. Numerous new
vocations, brought into being within the last quarter of a cenL. Ed. 923.
108 Md. 220, 70 AtI. 113, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.),1163.
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tury, and congestion not provided for during the period of the
development of early municipal territory, present problems
which demand the careful consideration of the legislative bodies
of the state governments, and in the making of adjustments,
due to these growing complexities of the present day civilization, the legislative authority will by necessity be compelled to
regulate to a greater extent than heretofore the use of property
owned by individuals.
The Spann case in unmistakable terms rejected a city
ordinance prohibiting the building of business houses in a
residence district, but it is to be remembered that the type of
business under consideration was an ordinary retail store and
that when the decision spoke of such ordinances as representing conditions not to be tolerated in this country, such declarations in this deision by the court stand for nothing more than
that an ordinance cannot be held constitutional which declares
a business, not harmful to the general public, which does not
interfere with the citizen's enjoyment of his property, or injure
the morals or general welfare, as being a nuisance and prohibits
the establishment of that business in a certain section of the
city, is not a valid exercise of .6 police power and is unconstitutional. The great weight of authority has established the
principle, that an ordinary retail business house does not represent such use of property which may be restricted, from any
particular zone established within the corporate limits of a
municipality, under the police power of the state or municipal
government, that ordinances prohibiting the establishment of
ordinary business houses within a residence district is an unconstitutional infringement upon the rights of the property
owners wifhin that district, who may desire to use their property for the establishment of retail business houses.
The Des Moines case declared constitutional an ordinance
which created a restricted residence district. This case prohibited the use of property in conducting a type of business,
which in its nature becomes a constant annoyance to any residence district, that of establishing and maintaining a gasoline
filing station. There is ample authority to support the principle, that the state or municipal authority may restrict the use
of property in a residence district when that use becomes a constant annoyance to the property owners of the district, and is
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detrimental to the general welfare, health and happiness of
the citizens within that district, that so restricting the use of
property is within the police power of the state, and does not
violate the constitutional guarantees to the citizenry of the state.
Garages and gasoline filling stations unquestionably come within
this principle and are subject to any reasonable regulation and
restriction prescribed by the legislative authority of a state,
after taking under consideration the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the community in which they are established.
The state may regulate the use of property to the point of
forbidding thereon certain businesses within themselves lawful, as in the case of slaughter-houses, cemeteries, garages, gasoline supply stations, livery stables, blacksmith shops, laundries
and numerous other types of businesses. It may regulate building in the interest of health and fire safety, this being one of
the controlling influences in the Welch and the Cochron cases
digested above. It may limit the height of buildings in certain districts, or the character of buildings in these districts. It
may, to certain extent, prevent -the erection of billboards, or
limit their height. Briefly stated, it may regulate any business
or the use of any property in the interest of the public health,
public morals, or welfare, provided this be done reasonably.
To this extent the public interest is superior to private interest
and private use of property, and when private interest is compelled to subordinate itself because of the serving of the general
welfare of the public, as outlined above, there is no violation of
the constitutional guarantees.
Zoning ordinances which restrict the use of property upon
the grounds of purely esthetic consideration are not constitutionaL1 9 The state cannot control the use of property so as to
meet the particular esthetic taste of any group of property
owners, but, if the primary and substantial purpose of the
legislation is such as justifies the ordinance, considerations of
taste and beauty may enter in as auxiliaries. 20 The court
in the Cochron case said, after holding that the legislative conception of artistic beauty and symmetry will not be sustained,
"It may be that in the development of a higher civilization, the
culture and refinement of the people reached the point where the
" Cochran v. Preston, supra.
Welch v. Swasey, suprm.
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educational effect of the fine arts, as expressed and embodied in
architectural symmetry and harmony, is so well recognized as to
give sanction under some circumstances, to the exercise of this
power, even for such purposes."
The law on this subject, in that it deals with rights which
may be limited by the exercise of the police power, is not clearly
defined. Each case is, by necessity, determined according to its
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the use of the
property which is being controlled by legislative enactment.
Before a statute or ordinance, controlling the use of property,
may be declared constitutional it must be established that the
use the state or municipal corporation is endeavoring to control comes within their jurisdiction under the police power,
and that the statute or ordinance preserves public health,
safety, comfort, or welfare of the inhabitants of the state. A
law which assumes to be a police regulation, but deprives the
citizen of the use of his property under the pretense of preserving the public health, safety, comfort, or welfare, when it is
manifested that such is not the real object and purpose of the
regulation will be set aside as a clear and direct invasion of
the right of property without compensation.
GEORGE W.

MEUTH,

Attorney-at-Law.
Bowling Green, Ky.

